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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case
This an appeal from the judgment of the
against Respondents

Strata,

Inc.

and

Comstock, and Michael G. Woodworth
Strata’s

Motion

all

claims asserted

former employees H. Robert Howard, Chris M.

(collectively, “Strata”),

with prejudice following grant of

Appellant BrunoBuilt, Inc.’s Motion for Reconsideration. The

dismissed the claims asserted in
parties

dismissing

Enforce Settlement Agreement 0r Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, and

t0

denial in part of

its

district court

this action

pursuant t0 I.R.C.P. 56(a) because

it

district court

found that the

had previously reached an enforceable settlement agreement concerning the claims

issue in this action. Strata asserts that this

at

ﬁnding should be afﬁrmed 0n appeal because the

record before this Court reﬂects that the parties reached an enforceable settlement agreement

following assent t0 the form 0f settlement agreement and release by BrunoBuilt’s counsel,

that,

BrunoBuilt refused t0 perform. The

district court also

dismissed the claims asserted in this action

pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(a) 0n the alternative ground that they were barred by the economic loss
rule.

This Court should afﬁrm the

shows

that the only

district court’s

damages claimed

ﬁnding because the record before

in this matter are for

damages

t0 a piece

Court

of real property

and improvements made thereon, both of which are the subject of the only transaction
this

this

at issue in

matter—the agreement between BrunoBuilt and William and Anne Dempsey (“Dempseys”).
Strata also asserts that

even

if this

Court ﬁnds that the claims asserted by BrunoBuilt are

not barred by the parties’ prior settlement agreement 0r the economic loss doctrine,

afﬁrm the

district

court’s

limitations (I.C. § 5-219(4))

reﬂects that any

ﬁnding
and

that the

statute

work performed by

should

claims are barred by the applicable statute of

0f repose (LC.

Strata

it

§ 5-241(a)).

The record before

this

on the Nativa Terra subdivision, which gives

Court
rise t0

the

damages claimed by BrunoBuilt

that

any action arising from

BrunoBuilt did not ﬁle

that

suit until

in this action,

was completed by February

work must have been ﬁled by February

September

19,

5,

5,

2017, over a year and a half too

2008, meaning
2016. Because

Court

late, this

should afﬁrm the dismissal 0f this action with prejudice because those claims are time barred.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings

The Dempsey Property/Earth Movement

A.

This matter arises from earth
Terra Nativa Subdivision N0. 4,

movement

Ada

Idaho (“Property”). (R., pp. 10-11,

1]

affecting property located at Lot 16,

County, Idaho,
10).

known

as

Block

6,

238 N. Alto Via Court, Boise,

BrunoBuilt became the holder of legal

title

t0 the

Property pursuant t0 a contract With the Dempseys, the former owners 0f the Property, for the

purposes of constructing residential improvement on the Property, upon completion of which,

BrunoBuilt was to reconvey the Property to the Dempseys in exchange for the contract price.1
(Id.).

BrunoBuilt constructed a

Dempseys due

property to the

Earth

home 0n

the Property. (1d,) BrunoBuilt did not reconvey the

to their repudiation

movement began

of the construction contract.

t0 occur in the Terra Nativa subdivision in

was located 0n 0r about February 2016.

(R., p.

11,

Property was not affected at the time, but some earth

BrunoBuilt alleged the earth movement caused

it

11

16).

The home constructed upon

movement

“damages

in the

construction of a retaining wall and other related expenses that

1

.

.

.

This Court

[and] 10st market value 0f the

is

(Id.).

form of increased cost of

Dempsey

lot

would not have otherwise been

and improvements constructed thereon.”

invited t0 take judicial notice, pursuant t0 I.R.E. 201, 0f the fact that BrunoBuilt

in litigation with

related

did occur on the Property.

the

including additional testing and inspection, increased interest costs, and the

construction,

incurred

which the Property

damage

its

to the

is

insurance agent and insurer concerning insurance coverage for landslide-

Dempsey property

in

Ada County Case N0. CV01-18-12862.
2

on

(R. pp. 12, 13, 1H] 20, 26). In brieﬁng

that

damage occurred

home

to the

Motionfor Reconsideration, BrunoBuilt also averted

its

constructed on the Property. (R., pp. 664-66, 1W 24.a—24.g).

B. Development/Geotechnical Engineering

The subdivision
years

in

and

its

Subdivision

which the Property was located has been under development

by Terra Nativa, LLP.

Strata, Inc.

Work 0n the Nativa Terra

(R., p. 126,

1]

Howard

predecessor,

At various points

6).

in time

for

many

between 1998 and 2008,

Consultants, provided geotechnical consultation and

engineering work, along with construction oversight services, for subdivison pursuant t0
contracts with Terra Nativa,

performed pursuant

LLP.

t0 a series

(R., pp. 126-27,

0f contracts with

contracting parties. (R., pp. 126-27, 130-43,
third-party beneﬁciaries, nor d0 they

Strata, Inc.’s

work

1H]

W 4-12).

Strata, Inc.

Strata, Inc.’s consulting

and Terra Nativa,

4-12, Exs. A-D).

None 0f those

for Terra Nativa,

were subjected

to peer

Engineering.3 (R., pp. 126-27,
Inc. contracted

W

LLP was performed

LLC

Once

this process

in phases.

which was

site,

was completed

to provide construction oversight

which culminated with work on what was known
(“Subdivision”),

contracts identify

The

initial

phases

Which resulted

in

review by the City of Boise (“City”)2 and Kleinfelder

4-8).

With Terra Nativa,

as the sole

mention BrunoBuilt, the Dempseys, 0r the Property. (Id).

consisted of a geological and geotechnical engineering evaluation 0f the

reports that

LLP

work was

later platted as

in early 2005, Strata,

work on

as Nativa Terra Subdivision

Nativa Terra Subdivision No.

N0.

the project,

3

— Phase 2

4. (R., pp. 127,

139-42,

W 9-10, EX. C). This work was performed primarily by Terry Howard, Ph.D., P.E., P.G. (now
2

is

This Court

is

invited to take judicial notice, pursuant to I.R.E. 201, of the fact that BrunoBuilt

currently in litigation With the

damages
3

is

Dempseys, Terra Nativa LLP, and the City of Boise, seeking
Ada County Case N0. CV01-17-23686.

related to the Property at issue in this matter in

This Court

is

invited to take judicial notice, pursuant t0 I.R.E. 201, of the fact that BrunoBuilt

currently in litigation with Kleinfelder, Inc. seeking

this

matter in

Testing

&

Ada County Case N0.

CV OC

damages

related to the Property at issue in

16-09068 (“First BrunoBuilt Action”). Materials

Inspection, Inc.; Treasure Valley Engineers, Inc.; and Matrix Engineering, Inc. along

with various employees of those

entities

were also named.
3

(R., at pp. 56-64).

M. Comstock, who was an engineer

deceased) and Christopher
project.

H. Robert

no involvement

Howard

in training at the time of the

served as engineer of record on the project. Michael

in this phase of the project as

(R., pp. 122—23; pp. 126-27,

he was not employed by

1W 8-10). Via a February

2008,

5,

(R., p. 127,

1]

11-12; p. 143

engineer of record 0n this proj ect. Mr. Comstock and Mr.

phase ofthe project.
Strata,

of the

lot

Property.

5,

1]

10; p. 123,

builders, but they

2008. (R., p. 123,

11

(Id.).

1]

notiﬁed Terra

located and

Howard

its

8; p.

work

served as

Woodworth had no involvement

in this

4-5).

lots

Via

contract

with

speciﬁc

performed n0 further general work on the Subdivision
127, 1W 13-14, 16). Mr.

Woodworth was involved

in

after

some

speciﬁc work conducted in this area, but never worked on any projects affecting the

Woodworth

Decl., (R. p. 123,

ﬂ

BrunoBuilt concerning the Property nor did
p. 123,

1N

is

EX. D). H. Robert

,

performed work on some individual

Inc.

homeowners and
February

(R., p. 127,

Strata, Inc. at the time.

letter, Strata, Inc.

Nativa and the City that construction of Subdivision Where the Property

on the project was complete.

Woodworth had

8; p.

None 0f

127,

11

15-16).

6—8). Strata did not enter into

it

any contracts With

perform any lot-speciﬁc work on the Property. (R.

Strata has never

performed any lot-speciﬁc work on the Property.

any mention of BrunoBuilt 0r

the contracts for the project in question contain

subsequent owners 0f lots in the Nativa Terra Subdivision.

(R., pp. 130-42).

C. Demand/First BrunoBuilt Action

On

October

Strata, tendering a

13,

2016, BrunoBuilt, through

demand made by Rowans

Alto Via Court, Boise, Idaho. (R.,

home

arose from the earth

pending action against

p. 51,

1]

for

its

counsel,

Wyatt Johnson, sent a

damage occurring

3; pp. 65-68).

home

located at 241 N.

The alleged damages

movement discussed above and were

Strata, Sericati, et a1. V. Strata, Inc., et

4

t0 a

al.,

letter to

t0 the

Rowan

the subject 0f a separately

Ada County Case N0.

CV OC

16—09068. (R.,
tender, based

1W 2-3; pp. 65-68).

p. 51,

upon the terms of the

project (reﬂecting

not involved).

work

(R.

p.

On

contract between Strata, Inc. and BrunoBuilt for the

separate from BrunoBuilt’s

51,

1]

pp.

4;

and other

The Complaint alleged

for the

5 1,

site,

Which

Strata

was

5; 75-77).

11

project. (R., p. 5 1,

was professionally negligent by,

pre—existing landslide at the Terra Nativa

in

ﬁled the First BrunoBuilt Action against Strata

be involved with the Subdivision

that Strata

Dempseys,

Rowan

October 28, 2016, BrunoBuilt requested

letter. (R., p.

19, 2016, BrunoBuilt, Inc.

entities alleged to

work

On

69-74).

reconsideration of this decision in a subsequent

On December

October 21, 2016, Strata rejected BrunoBuilt’s

and

that, as

1]

6; pp. 56-64).

inter alia, failing t0 identify a

a result, BrunoBuilt suffered damages,

including increased construction costs and expenses, including the lost value 0f the Property. (R.,

21-24, 26, 29-34). BrunoBuilt also alleged constructive fraud and third-party

pp. 59-61,

1H}

beneﬁciary

liability claims. (R., pp.

61-63, 1H 35-47).

D. Settlement Negotiations Between Strata/BrunoBuilt

On

January

3,

2017, Strata’s counsel met With Mr. Johnson, BrunoBuilt counsel,4 to

discuss dismissal 0f the case. (R., pp. 51-52,

11

8). Strata’s

counsel requested that the case be

dismissed With prejudice based upon the strength 0f Strata’s defenses, including statute of
limitations

On

and economic

loss,

Which request was rejected by BrunoBuilt.

(R., pp. 51-52,

January 10, 2018, Strata’s counsel and Mr. Johnson had a telephone

Johnson conveyed BrunoBuilt’s agreement
covenant not t0 sue by the Rowans.

call, in

t0 release its claims against Strata in

(R., pp. 51-52,

1]

8).

On

W

7-8).

which Mr.
exchange a

January 12, 2017, a Conﬁdential

Release 0f A11 Claims and Indemnity Agreement was executed between the Plaintiffs in the
4

This Court

is

invited to take judicial notice, pursuant to I.R.E. 201, 0f the fact BrunoBuilt

is

currently involved in litigation With Mr. Johnson related t0 the professional services provided by
Mr. Johnson in the First BrunoBuilt Action in Ada County Case N0. CV01-18-11685, Which
matter has been stayed pending resolution of the underlying lawsuits.
5

Sericati

Action and

The
10,

Strata,

which included the Rowan covenant not

parties continued to negotiate the terms

2017, and February

9,

2017,

when

to sue. (R., p. 52,

11

9).

of BrunoBuilt’s settlement between January

Strata provided BrunoBuilt with a draft release agreement,

pursuant to which the claims against Strata only would be dismissed with prejudice in
consideration for the

Rowan

conference on March

1,

covenant not to sue.

(R., p. 52,

1}

10; pp. 78-86).

During a telephone

2017, concerning the proposed release agreement, Mr. Johnson

represented to Strata’s counsel that his client no longer believed that Strata had a deal with

BrunoBuilt and that

March

3,

2017,

it

letter,

could proceed With the

litigation,

prompting counsel for Strata to send a

outlining the basis for the parties’ settlement, the language 0f the

covenant, and listing the defenses that would be asserted. (R., p. 52,

On March

9,

1H]

Rowan

11-12; pp. 87-91).

2017, Mr. Johnson responded via email, noting “[m]y client

is

ready to

complete the settlement process” and requesting some changes to a previously provided draft
release, including

was provided

to

term changes.

mutual release language.

Mr. Johnson Via a

(R., p. 53,

1]

May

10,

(R., p. 52,

1]

13; p. 92).

A revised release

agreement

2017, email, Which included BrunoBuilt’s requested

Given the acceptance of BrunoBuilt’s requested

14; pp. 93-106).

changes t0 the release agreement, counsel for Strata sent an email t0 Mr. Johnson which asked,

among

other things “Has your client agreed to sign?” (R. p. 107-08). In response, on June 14,

2017, Mr. Johnson stated “I’m just trying to get him chased

The six—month time period

for service

4(b)(2) in the First BrunoBuilt Action expired

been served.

(R., p. 53,

11

16).

On

own

for signature.” (1d,).

of process under Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure

on June

19, 2017, at

Which time

11

17; pp.

109-10).

had

NOT

July 31, 2017, Strata’s counsel again emailed Mr. Johnson,

inquiring as to the status 0f execution 0f the settlement agreement, to

(R., p. 53,

Strata

On

August

2,

which he did not respond.

2017, Strata’s counsel received a

letter

from

new

Christine Salmi, BrunoBuilt’s then

settlement agreement and

counsel, arguing that the parties did not have a valid

making a $500,000.00 settlement demand.

(R., pp. 111-17).

E. Dismissal of the First BrunoBuilt Action/Filing 0f the Second BrunoBuilt Action

On
basis

September

2017, the

19,

of BrunoBuilt’s failure

BrunoBuilt ﬁled

Mr. Johnson.

its

that this matter

effect timely

t0

Complaint and

(R., pp. 9-14; p. 53,

district court

Demand

service.

(R.,

this matter. (Id.).

1]

20).

Once

On March

Mr. Johnson indicated

again, the

13,

Complaint and

that

by Ms. Salmi, noting

that she

Demand

had substituted

and requesting a waiver of service for

was

frivolous. (R., p. 54,

F. Strata’s

elect t0 forego pursuit

for Jury Trial in this action

0f

was not

21).

1]

ﬂ

its

Strata,

in as counsel for BrunoBuilt in this

Which

Strata refused. (R. p. 54,

position to Ms. Salmi that this matter

22). Strata

was served 0n March

was

settled

ﬂ 21;

p.

and the

15-16, 2018. (R., p. 54, ﬂ 23).

Request for Dismissal 0f this Action

In response to the

Agreement 0r

may

BrunoBuilt

2018, six days before the service deadline, Strata’s counsel was again

121). Strata’s counsel reiterated

action

which was signed by

counsel again contacted Mr. Johnson, requesting

served and n0 further action was taken by BrunoBuilt. (R., p. 54,

action,

The same day,

118-120).

be dismissed, an issue that Mr. Johnson further indicated he would explore With

his client. (R., p. 53,

contacted

pp.

for Jury Trial in this action,

19). Strata’s

1]

dismissed the First BrunoBuilt Action on the

Second BrunoBuilt Action,

Alternatively, for

Strata ﬁled a

Summary Judgment (“Motion

t0

Motion

t0

Enforce Settlement

Enforce”) 0n April

5,

2018,

seeking dismissal 0n the basis 0f the parties’ settlement agreement, along with the applicable
statutes

0f limitations (LC.

§

5-219(4)) and repose (LC. § 5-241(a)) and the economic loss

doctrine. (See generally R. pp. 15-143).

from BrunoBuilt, was

fully briefed

The Motion

and argued on

t0

May

Enforce, along With a Rule 56(d) motion

15,

2018. (See generally,

Tr., at

78-160).

The

district court issued its

Memorandum

Settlement Agreement 0r, Alternatively, for

56(d)

(“MSJ Decision”) on

Decision and Order 0n Motion t0 Enforce

Summary Judgment and Motion for

July 12, 2018. (R., pp. 316-47).

The

district

Relief under

court concluded that, as

0f January 20, 2017, an enforceable agreement had been reached, pursuant to which BrunoBuilt

would provide

Strata with a Pierringer release in

exchange for the provision of a covenant not to

sue BrunoBuilt from the Rowans. (R., p. 333). The Court found that BrunoBuilt later proposed

modiﬁcation of

this

agreement to provide a mutual release, which Strata accepted.

Court found that declarations

concerning the

subjective

(Id.).

The

of Robert Bruno

intent/beliefs

(BrunoBuilt’s principal), and Mr. Johnson did not create a question of material fact in the face of
clear evidence 0f a settlement agreement

between the

parties. (R., pp.

33

1,

333).

The Court

found that BrunoBuilt’s claims against Strata were barred by the applicable

and repose,

limitations

property improvement
Inc.’s engineering

I.C.

§§ 5-219(4) and 5-241(a). The

at issue for the

district court

also

0f

statutes

found that the

real

purposes 0f the statute of limitations/repose was Strata,

work 0n Nativa Terra Subdivision N0.

4,

which was completed on February

5,

2008, (R., pp. 337-39). Consequently, the Court found that the statute of limitation ran on

February

8,

2016, making BrunoBuilt’s claims in this action time barred. (R., pp. 339—40).

Finally, the district court

economic

which

it

loss rule.

found that the claims asserted by BrunoBuilt were barred by the

Based upon

its

reasoning on

its

ruling in the First BrunoBuilt Action in

dismissed claims brought by BrunoBuilt against Kleinfelder and others, the Court found

that BrunoBuilt’s

damages were economic

losses

ﬂowing from

could not be recovered pursuant to the economic loss

the

Dempsey

contract,

which

rule. (R., pp. 341-43).

G. BrunoBuilt’s Motion for Reconsideration
BrunoBuilt ﬁled

its

Motion for Reconsideration of the

MSJ Decision

on September

18,

2018.

It

parties

argued that questions of material fact precluded the

district court’s

had an enforceable settlement agreement, the improvements

the statute of limitations/repose

was the work

Strata speciﬁcally

ﬁnding

at issue for the

that the

purposes of

performed on Nativa Terra

Subdivision No. 4, and the Property was the subject 0f the transaction for economic loss
purposes. (R., p. 761).

The

The matter was

district court issued its

(“Reconsider Decision”) on

fully briefed

Memorandum

November

6,

and argued on October

Decision and Order 0n Motion

2018, in which

concerning the parties’ settlement agreement and economic

it

loss.

upheld

not to sue and

Strata

would

release,

its

deliver a covenant not t0 sue

subjective assertions,

which were insufﬁcient

district court also rejected

transaction.” (R., p. 769).

was

770).

was

Based upon

ﬁnding

was

The

the lot

this

the

objective

concluded there was. (R,

denying reconsideration on

BrunoBuilt’s argument for reconsider on economic loss

lot

could not be considered to be the “subject of the

and the home BrunoBuilt agreed

that BrunoBuilt’s claims

this point,

t0 contradict the record. (Id).

district court reiterated that the parties

ﬁnding, the

which

upon by BrunoBuilt were nothing

the construction contract between BrunoBuilt and the

that transaction

it

there

On

from Paul and Becky Rowan in exchange for a mutual

(R., pp. 764-769). In

based upon the claim that the house and

at issue

previous ﬁndings

delivery did not alter the parties’ intent to enter into an agreement in

the district court reiterated that the alleged factual issues relied

The

Reconsider

found that Mr. Johnson’s intent concerning the form of the covenant

and Pierringer agreement.

more than

t0

p. 762).

(See R., pp. 761—772).

evidence 0f the parties’ intent t0 enter a settlement agreement, Which

it

its

was whether

settlement, the district court found that the relevant inquiry

pp. 763—64). Speciﬁcally,

2018. (R.,

9,

district court

agreed that the transaction

Dempseys and

to construct

upon

it.

the subject of

(R., pp.

769-

found that established precedent compelled a

were non-recoverable economic

losses

ﬂowing from

the house

and the

lot.

(R.,

limitations/ repose

on

that theory,

p.

770). Finally, the district court held that

was unnecessary

in light

mooting BrunoBuilt’s motion

its

ruling

on the

0f the above rulings and withdrew
to reconsider

on

its

statutes

0f

prior decision

that point. (R., pp. 770-71).

H. Entry 0f Judgment and Appeal

On December

18,

2018, BrunoBuilt, ﬁled a Notice oprpeal, which predated the Court’s

Judgment on January

10,

2019. (R., pp. 773-826, 845). This resulted in an Order of Conditional

Dismissal from

this Court,

which was withdrawn following entry 0f Judgment by the

court and BrunoBuilt’s ﬁling of an

their

Amended Notice oprpeal 0n January

district

28, 2019. Strata ﬁled

Designation 0f Additional Record 0n Appeal 0n February 11, 2019, Which included

documents entered

into the record

by

the district court

from a related

CV01-16-22915, Which were incorporated by reference

Ada Count Case N0.

into the district court’s

ISSUES PRESENTED

II.

action,

MSJ Decision.

ON APPEAL

BrunoBuilt articulates the issues 0n appeal as follows:

(a)

Did the

district

court err in holing that the parties reached an enforceable

settlement agreement?

(b)

Did the

district

court

err

holding that the

in

“economic

loss

rule”

bars

BrunoBuilt’s professional negligence claim against Strata?
Strata articulate the issues

1.

Whether

on appeal

as follows:

the district court correctly found that the patties’

entered into an

enforceable settlement, which precludes BrunoBuilt’s claims in this action.

2.

Whether the

district court correctly

determined that the economic loss rule bars

BrunoBuilt’s claims in this action.

3.

Whether this action

is

time-barred

by LC. §§ 5-219(4) and 5-241 (a).

10

Whether the claims asserted against Respondent Michael Woodworth should be

4.

dismissed With prejudice based upon a lack of evidence in the record.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

III.

1.

BrunoBuilt

2.

Strata should

is

not entitled to attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.

be awarded

their attorney’s fees

and costs on appeal pursuant

to

I.A.R. 40, I.A.R. 41 and I.C. §§ 12-121 and 12-120(3).

IV.

ARGUMENT

A. The district court correctly determined that Strata and BrunoBuilt entered into
a binding settlement agreement, barring BrunoBuilt’s claims in this action.
1.

Introduction

This Court should afﬁrm the

district court’s holding,

ﬁnding

reveals the existence 0f an enforceable settlement agreement

that the record in this matter

between the

based upon

parties

BrunoBuilt’s agreement to provide a Pierringer release to Strata in exchange for a covenant not
to sue

from the Rowans and a mutual

release. (R., at pp.

arguments t0 the contrary do nothing more than invite
subjective intent 0f

its

it

764-69). BrunoBuilt’s

Court t0 rely upon statements of the

cannot d0. Consequently, this Court should afﬁrm the dismissal With

prejudice of the claims asserted

by BrunoBuilt

in this action.

Standard oz Review
a.

Motion

“A motion

t0

Enforce Settlement Agreement

for the enforcement 0f a settlement agreement

summary judgment.” Seward

v.

86 (2012)). “[T]here

is

no

is

Musick Auction, LLC, 164 Idaho 149,

(2018) (quoting Estate ofHolland
80,

this

& n.13,

counsel and principal, rather than the record before this Court, which this

Court has indicated that

2.

329-333

v.

Metro. Prop.

&

treated as a

_, 426 P.3d 1249,

1256

Cas. Ins. C0., 153 Idaho 94, 100, 279 P.3d

right t0 a jury trial in connection With a

11

motion for

motion

to enforce a

settlement agreement.” Id. In cases where there

trier

of

fact is entitled to arrive at the

evidence properly before

it

On

no

right to a jury

“the

trial

court as the

most probable inference based upon the undisputed

v.

Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176-77, 233 P.3d 102, 107-08 (2010).

Motion for Summary Judgment

review of a grant of summary judgment,

review as the

trial,

and grant summary judgment despite the possibility of conﬂicting

inferences.” Id. (quoting Barley

b.

is

district court in ruling

Idaho 806, 810-1

1,

this

Court applies the same standard of

upon the summary judgment motion. Jackson

436 P.3d 627, 63 1-32 (2019) (quoting Lockheed Martin Corp.

Crow, 164

v.

v.

Idaho State

Tax Comm’n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006)). “Summary judgment

when

there

law.”

Id. at

is

n0 genuine issue 0f material

fact

485, 488 (2009)). “This Court liberally construes
all

proper

and the only remaining questions are questions 0f

811, 436 P.3d at 632 (quoting Chandler

party and draws

is

v.

Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 768, 215 P.3d

disputed facts in favor of the

all

nonmoving

reasonable inferences and conclusions suppoﬁed by the record in favor 0f the

party opposing the motion.” Id. (quoting Chandler, 147 Idaho at 768, 215 P.3d at 488).

c.

On

Motion

t0

Reconsider

a motion t0 reconsider, the district court applies the

original motion. Id. This Court, in turn, applies the

court’s ruling. Id.

“[W]hen

the district court grants

for reconsideration, this Court

material fact to defeat

178, 186,

this

as applicable t0 the

same standard When reviewing the

summary judgment and then

district

denies a motion

must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue 0f

summary judgment.”

(quoting Idaho First

Id.

426 P.3d 1278, 1286 (2018)) (modiﬁcation

evidence reveals no disputed issues 0f material

Which

same standard

fact,

in original).

Bridges, 164 Idaho

“For both motions,

‘[i]f

the

then only a question 0f law remains, over

Court exercises free review.”’ Id. (quoting Brooks

12

Bank v.

v.

Wal-Mart

Stores, Ina,

164 Idaho

22, 27, 423 P.3d 443,

3.

Even

if

448 (2018)) (modiﬁcation

not reduced t0 writing, a settlement agreement

contract,

which precludes subsequent

A valid settlement agreement precludes
subject of the

in original).

settlement

agreement.

Id.

litigation

is

enforceable as an oral

0fthe settled claims.

subsequent litigation over the claims that are the

The existence of a valid settlement agreement

“supersedes and extinguishes” pre-existing claims the parties intended to

Goodman
‘stands

v.

Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 625, 151 P.3d 818, 821 (2007)).

on the same footing as any other contract and

“A

settle. Id.

(quoting

settlement agreement

governed by the same rules and

is

principles as are applicable to contracts generally.’” Id. at 672, 151 P.3d at 865 (quoting Wilson

v.

Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341, 345 (1959)).

Court does not concern

itself with the “merits

When

asked t0 enforce a settlement, the

and validity of the original claim,” but instead with

the question of whether the settlement agreement before

it is

valid and enforceable. Id.

Settlement agreements need not be in writing t0 be enforceable. McColm-Traska

Baker, 139 Idaho 946, 951, 88 P.3d 767, 770 (Idaho 2004).

Where

parties to an oral

v.

agreement

contemplate a subsequent formal writing, the question of Whether the parties are bound prior to
written execution

is

“largely a question of intent.”

P.3d 1149, 1154 (Idaho 2002) (quoting Conley

807

(Ct.

App. 1995)). To be enforceable,

general requirements for contracts. Id.
contract and there

so,

v.

Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99, 44

Whittlesey, 126 Idaho 630, 633, 888 P.2d 804,

oral agreements

The contracting

parties

must otherwise comply with the
must show

their

mutual intent to

must be a meeting of the minds concerning the material terms 0f the

agreement. Lawrence

Even

V.

Kohring

v.

Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 898, 204 P.3d 532, 538 (Idaho App. 2009).

an agreement which features uncertain terms

“contain[s] provisions

which

may

still

be enforceable where

it

are capable in themselves 0f being reduced t0 certainty.” Id.

For example, the Idaho Court 0f Appeals enforced an oral settlement agreement
1

3

after

one

of the patties refused t0 execute a written version of the settlement agreement in
Security

made

Bank ofldaho,

NA,

1,

867 P.2d

at

settlement of

to fees

and

which was

costs,

264. Thereafter, the attorneys for the parties

orally accepted

by

worked together

Which included language indicating

stipulation for dismissal,

v.

First

125 Idaho 27, 867 P.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1994). There, the Suitts

a settlement offer of $6,030.65, reserving appeal on denial of a motion for leave to

and the issues of entitlement
3

Suitts

that

it

amend

defendants. Id. at

to prepare a written

was

a ﬁlll and ﬁnal

claims between the parties and that the Suitts were not waiving their right t0

all

seek any additional damages that were the subject to their preserved appeal right, s0 long as
those damages were “adequately pleaded.” Id. at 32, 867 P.2d at 265.

The

Suitts refused to

execute the stipulation or any other proposed stipulation, causing their attorney t0 Withdraw, and
the defendants’ attorney to ﬁle a motion for

settlement agreement. 1d.

The

district

summary judgment seeking enforcement 0f

court granted

summary judgment

the

to the defendants,

“conclud[ing] that a binding settlement agreement had been reached and that the dickering over

minor language differences for the

stipulation did not constitute a rejection

settlement offer, which had been accepted

November

3.” Id. (emphasis added).

conveyed and accepted contained

by

The court noted

proposed change in the stipulation drafted by the

from the agreed terms,

modiﬁcation
4.

.

.

.

;

it

would not

Subsequently

.

.

.

that the oral offer

material terms necessary for the formation of a binding

settlement agreement. 1d. at 33, 867 P.2d at 266.

variation

,

it

that “[e]ven if the defendants’

Suitts’ attorney

was

a material, substantial

would merely be a proposal by the defendants

for a

invalidate the then-existing oral agreement.” Id.

asserted subjective

intent

concerning settlement

is

irrelevant

determining the existence ofan enforceable oral settlement agreement 0r

Two

Suitts’

the defendants during telephone conversations of

The Court of Appeals afﬁrmed, ﬁnding

all

0f the

recent decisions from this Court,

14

Seward

v.

its

in

terms.

Musick Auction, LLC, supra, and

Kosmann

v.

Dim'us, Dkt. No. 45779, 2019

WL 2098775

parties’ subsequently asserted subjective expectations

(Idaho

May

14, 2019),

and

pp. 768—69), BrunoBuilt

MSJ Decision

(R., p. 333),

now

its

existence.

and the Reconsider Decision,

Strata reached an enforceable settlement

BrunoBuilt agreed to dismiss the claims

that the

concerning a settlement agreement and

terms are insufﬁcient to prevent enforcement of that agreement or to disprove
the district court found in both the

reafﬁrm

its

As
(R.,

agreement in Which

asserted in this action in exchange for Strata

securing a covenant not to sue from the Rowans. BrunoBuilt’s efforts to undermine that ﬁnding
are only based

upon

the subjective hopes 0f BrunoBuilt’s principal

and

its

former counsel and a

misunderstanding of the Court’s role in enforcing a settlement agreement. Seward and
aptly demonstrate

Kosmann

why such argument should be rejected.

In Seward, the parties mediated a

wage

claim, during Which they reached agreement to

dismiss the case and execute a release agreement in exchange for monetary payment
defendant. 164 Idaho at

court;

_, 426 P.3d

however, due t0 a technical

transcn'pt

was made.

Id.

at

The agreement was put on

1251.

error, the

by

the

the record before the

audio recording of the hearing failed and no

Subsequently, a dispute arose as to several terms of the subsequently

prepared written agreement, including whether the plaintiffs wife would be a signatory and
inclusion of a conﬁdentiality clause. Id. at

moved

to enforce the agreement. Id. at

agreement

at

_,

426 P.3d

at

1252-55. The plaintiff ultimately

_, 426 P.3d at 1255. The defendant contended that the

mediation was only an agreement to agree, which had ultimately failed

parties could not reach a formal, written agreement. Id.

The

district court

when

the

found an enforceable

settlement between the parties and granted the motion, at Which point the defendant appealed. Id.

On

appeal,

this

enforcement proceedings.

Court clariﬁed the standards of review that apply t0 settlement
Id. at

_.

426 P.3d

15

at

1255-56. Speciﬁcally, the Court noted that

enforcement
as

is

equitable relief,

ﬁnder of fact, as necessary.

meaning there

Id. at

1256.

As

is

no

right to a jury trial

such, “the

trial

court

.

.

.

and the
is

trial

entitled to arrive at the

most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before

summary judgment

court serves

it

and grant the

despite the possibility of conﬂicting inferences.” Id. (quoting Barley

v.

Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176-77, 233 P.3d 102, 107-08 (2010)). Based

upon

Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the

deciding the enforcement

motion, had
this

made an improper

Court found that the

district court, in

credibility determination. Id. at

district court

_, 426 P.3d

This Court found that instead, “[t]0 arrive

v.

this

at 1257. Instead,

Id.

at the real intention

of the

parties, th[e]

Court

and circumstances out 0f which the contract arose, and will construe the

contract in the light of such facts and circumstances.” Id. at

Werrjy

framework,

properly disregarded information set forth in afﬁdavits

concerning the parties’ subjective expectations regarding settlement.

“Will consider the facts

this

Phillips Petroleum C0., 97 Idaho 130, 136,

that the record reﬂected that the plaintiff

426 P.3d

at

1258 (quoting

540 P.2d 792, 798 (1975)). This Court held

had agreed

payment of $15,000, which was sufﬁcient

_,

to dismiss the action in

to give rise to

exchange for the

an enforceable agreement, despite

subsequent disagreement about the terms of the written release agreement or the parties’
subjective expectations concerning settlement. Id. at

in this matter

made

precisely the

and Wishes count for nothing. The

same ﬁnding
status

_, 426 P.3d

in its

at

MSJ Decision,

1258-60. The district court
noting that “[s]ecret hopes

0f a document as a contract depends 0n what the parties

express to each other and to the world, not on What they keep to themselves.” (R., at p. 12
(quoting Newkirk

v.

Vill

ofStreger, 536 F.3 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2008)).

This Court reafﬁrmed the reasoning 0f Seward in Kosmann. There, faced with similar
facts

concerning disputes in reducing a mediated settlement to writing, this Court engaged in the

16

same

analysis as in Seward, noting that the issue was, at heart, one of enforceability of oral

contract,

which was dependent upon the

parties’ intent. Id. at *5. This

evidence to support the parties’ intent to contract
clients.” Id. (quoting

Seward, 164 Idaho

at

is to

look

_, 426 P.3d

at

at the

Court found that “the best

words of counsel and

1258-59). This Court found that the

evidence in the record demonstrated clear intent t0 enter into a settlement.
reiterated, again

it

determines that different or additional terms

this

matter

is

much the same and warrants

the

This Court should afﬁrm the the

5.

may

based upon Seward, that a party

MSJ

Id. Further, this

Court

not avoid a valid contract simply because

may be

same

their

desirable. Id.

The

situation presented in

result.

Decision and Reconsider Decision, ﬁnding that

BrunoBuilt and Strata entered into an oral settlement agreement, which was not
invalidated by BrunoBuilt’s later—formed subjective intent concerning such terms.
BrunoBuilt seeks to avoid enforcement 0f the settlement agreement almost entirely upon
the improper subjective beliefs of BrunoBuilt’s principal, Robert Bruno,

Wyatt Johnson. (See

R., at pp. 701-06; Appellant’s

Opening

and

its

former counsel,

Brief, at 15—22). Indeed, Strata

previously objected t0 the consideration of declarations in which these self—serving statements

were made because they ran afoul of the admissibility requirements of Rule 56 and case law
interpreting the same. (See R., at 300-01 (citing Idaho R. CiV. P. 56(c) (formerly set forth in

56(c), requiring averments

submitted in support 0f motions for

admissible in evidence) and State

v.

Shama

summary judgment

Rule

to

be

Res. Ltd. P’Ship, 127 Idaho 267, 270-71, 899 P.2d

977, 980-81 (1995) (ﬁnding that conclusory and self—serving afﬁdavit testimony should not be

considered in deciding

summary judgment

consider such statements. (R., at pp. 329-333

The

plain fact

is that

motions)).

The

& n.13, 764-69).

district court

properly refused to

This Court should do the same.

the objective evidence in the record demonstrates that the parties

agreed that BrunoBuilt would dismiss

its

claims against Strata in exchange for Strata obtaining a

17

covenant not t0 sue from the Rowans, with Mr. Johnson explicitly agreeing to that offer on
BrunoBuilt’s behalf on January
statement that “[d]uring

would be willing
but

.

.

.

my

to dismiss

any agreement

sue that was signed

by

2017. (See R.,

January 9

call

at pp.

174—75; 329-330 (quoting Johnson’s

with Mr. Scanlan,

I

advised him that BrunoBuilt

claims against Strata in exchange for a release from the Rowans,

its

t0 settle

the

9,

[]

would be conditioned upon

Rowans and

Strata securing a covenant not t0

expressly stated that BrunoBuilt

was an intended

third-

party beneﬁciary of that covenant”); and at pp. 765 (rejecting BrunoBuilt’s argument that

acceptance was conditioned 0n delivery of a covenant not to sue in Which BrunoBuilt was
as

named

an express beneﬁciary, based upon nothing more than his conclusory declaration». The

district court ﬁlrther

found that the covenant not t0 sue, the language 0f Which was provided to

BrunoBuilt’s counsel and appears in the record of this action, was indeed an express covenant for
BrunoBuilt’s beneﬁt by operation of law. (R.,

at pp. 88,

330-31, 764-766). Consistent with this

agreement and Mr. Johnson’s declaration, the Court further found that BrunoBuilt explicitly
agreed on January 20, 2017, that the release
that the parties

had an agreement as of that

it

would provide would be a Pierringer

release,

and

date. (R., at pp. 176, 331, 766-767).

Faced With a clear record demonstrating objective evidence 0f a settlement agreement, as
expressed in the Court’s
following points, as
o

it

MSJ

Decision and Reconsider Decision, BrunoBuilt ﬁxates on the

did in seeking reconsideration, to escape the parties’ agreement:

Strata’ alleged refusal t0 agree to/provide a

Becky Rowan t0 Which BrunoBuilt
Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 16-18; (R.,
o

BrunoBuilt’s

alleged withdrawal

0f

is

covenant not t0 sue from Paul and

an express third—party beneﬁciary,

at pp. 700-04);

its

agreement

t0

a Pierringer

release,

Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 18-20; (R., at pp. 704-07);
0

The contention

that the draft release

agreements exchanged between the parties

contained additional terms, including conﬁdentiality, that the parties did not
discuss, Appellants’

Opening Brief,
18

at

20-21; (R., at 704-07); and

o

Bruno’s and Johnson’s subjective belief that an agreement had not been reached,
(R., at pp. 704, 706-07).

Each 0f these points
a.

is

Covenant not t0

With respect

3,

Rowan

argument also ignores the

2017,

(1d,).

letter,

language of the covenant not t0 sue, as provided to

operated to

make BrunoBuilt an

express third-party

covenant. (R., at pp. 88-89, 330—31, 764-766). Similarly, BrunoBuilt’s
fact that

it

was provided With

its

the language of the covenant

legal effect similar to that set forth in the

0n March

MSJ Decision.

After receiving this information, contrary t0 demanding that a signed copy of the covenant

be provided, as both Mr. Johnson and Mr. Bruno claim in
“It

and applicable law.

sue.

2017, along with a discussion 0f

3,

record, the district court’s ﬁndings,

to the ﬁrst point, the

BrunoBuilt in a March

beneﬁciary t0 the

by the

refuted

was very helpfu

[sic] to

their declarations,

have the language the Rowans agreed

proceed t0 complete the settlement process.”

(R.,

at p.

92).

to.

Mr. Johnson stated

My

client is

ready t0

This evidence in the record

undermines Mr. Johnson’s and Mr. Bruno’s subjective beliefs concerning delivery 0f the
covenant, which are to be disregarded in any event under
Further, as BrunoBuilt’s counsel

the

Rowan

from
753,

all

11

5;

covenant

is

contained

parties to the release

pp. 758-59).5

Given

is

was well aware,

Seward and Kosmann.
the Sericati release agreement in

which

subject t0 a conﬁdentiality clause, requiring speciﬁc consent

agreement before

it

this burden, as well as

this area that the consideration for a release

could be disclosed to BrunoBuilt. (R.,

custom and practice among

agreement

is

at p.

civil litigators in

generally exchanged for a signed copy

of the agreement by the releasing party, the signed covenant not to sue had not yet been provided

5

This portion of the record reﬂects that BrunoBuilt’s current counsel,

the

Rowans, were of the mind

only

when

that the

absolutely necessary.

at the

time representing

covenant could not be disclosed Without their consent and

(Id.).

19

to

BrunoBuilt

at the

time

it

elected not to perform. (R., at p. 753,

1]

settlement agreement and refusal t0 execute the release, however,

provided With a signed copy of the

Rowan covenant not to

Finally, BrunoBuilt tries to avoid

6).

is

BrunoBuilt’s breach 0f the
the only reason

agreement through the argument that the

its

from the Rowans before the release was ﬁnalized. Appellant’s

law.

The

district court rejected this

Rowan

it

had been obtained

Br., at 19. This

Court should ﬁnd,

internally inconsistent

is

was not

sue.

covenant could not serve as consideration for the release agreement because

as the district court did, that this position

it

and inconsistent with Idaho

argument as nonsensical because

it

was

inconsistent With

BrunoBuilt’s argument that the covenant had to be delivered prior to settlement, in essence,
arguing that Strata had t0 provide the covenant before the settlement was ﬁnal, but that a

covenant obtained before the release was ﬁnal was invalid consideration. (R.,
BrunoBuilt’s argument on this point

is

at p.

766

supported by only one line from Collard

Cooley, 92 Idaho 789, 792, 451 P.2d 525, 528 (1969), which provides “[a] promise
to

n.2).

is

v.

never held

be made enforceable by reason of past events unless those events have such a relation to the

promise as constitute

its

inducing cause.”

Id.

BrunoBuilt’s argument ignores the second half 0f

the quotation, along with the line that follows

inducement of the promise; but they must

it,

which provides “[t]hey need not be the

at least

be one of the major inducing factors.”

Although Strata negotiated the Rowan covenant as part of another settlement,
express intent that

it

discussed, supra, p.

would serve
18,

sole

it

did so With the

as the consideration for the BrunoBuilt settlement as well.

Mr. Johnson had agreed

to

Id.

accept the covenant not to

As

sue as

consideration 0n January 9, 2017, days before the agreement in which the covenant

was

contained was ﬁnalized. Indeed, the negotiations with BrunoBuilt’s counsel and the Rowans’

counsel occurred in tandem, with the

Rowan

covenant becoming an integral part 0f the

20

Rowan

settlement in order to complete the BrunoBuilt settlement. (R., at p. 5 1-52,

make

sufﬁcient t0

the

Rowan

11

8-9). This relation is

covenant valid consideration under Collard.

Pierringer release.

b.

BrunoBuilt’s nonsensical argument concerning withdrawal of the Pierringer release,
unsupported.

similarly

Speciﬁcally,

contention, from an email from

the

language upon Which BrunoBuilt

Wyatt Johnson

to

relies

ran the issue by the client. If it’s giving a release, [Bruno] wants a release.
doesn’t need any Perringer [sic] stuff, just that Strata won’t darken his door.
logic

right

is

this

Kevin Scanlan provides:

I

The

for

is

He

hard to argue. If nobody thinks there’s a claim, the harm of guessing

and doing the release doesn’t hurt anybody. However, guessing wrong only

hurts BrunoBuilt.

[R., at pp.

93, 332].

BrunoBuilt

itself

point

The only reasonable inference

to

be drawn from

did not need a Pierringer release, not that

it

this

language

is

that

refused t0 provide one. (Id). This

supported only by self—serving declaration testimony, which cannot be relied upon to

is

contradict the record per Seward.

c.

Disagreem ent over written release agreement terms.

Similarly, the

additional,

in both

agreement provided by Strata contained

that the draft release

unagreed upon terms

As noted

matter.

argument

is

also disposed of

by Seward and

Seward and Kosmann, Where,

the factual record in this

as here, the material terms

0f an

agreement have been reached, subsequent disagreement concerning the ﬁnal written agreement
will not

undermine a settlement. As the

district court

found, by January 20, 2017, the parties

agreed to the material terms 0f the settlement, as conceded in Mr. Johnson’s declaration:

Based upon

my

conversations

with

Mr.

Scanlan,

it

understanding that Mr. Scanlan would prepare and send t0

was

me

my

intent

memorializing the release terms the parties had aggeed upon and that

would then have
it

the opportunity to review the agreement

accurately reﬂected the parties’ agreed-upon terms.

21

and

a draft agreement

and sign

it,

my

client

to the extent

(R., at pp.

176,

3.1

1]

Pierringer release

(emphasis added); 331; 764-65). Those tenns included provision of a

by BrunoBuilt

in

exchange for the

10; 174-176, 1H] 3.g-j; 329-331; 764-65),

agreement was prepared.
indicated

its

(R.,

at pp.

“I’m just trying

to get

him

9,

8; 52,

1]

0n March

9,

2017. (R.,

at p. 92, 331).

2017, inquiry as to whether BrunoBuilt’s principal

Mr. Johnson, BrunoBuilt’s agent, replied 0n June

[Mr. Bruno] chased

down

BrunoBuilt did not address these issues
this

11

with subsequent modiﬁcations agreed t0 as the release

intention t0 proceed with the settlement

to sign the agreement,

covenant, (R., at pp. 51,

92-93, 331-32, 764-67). Indeed, BrunoBuilt’s counsel

Again, in response to Mr. Grifﬁths’ June

had agreed

Rowan

14, 2017,

for signature.” (R., at p. 107-08, 332).

when

pointed out by the

district court or

before

Court with any citation to evidence in the record contradicting the parties’ agreement.

Appellant’s Brieﬁ at 22-23. Instead,

it

invites this

Court to do what

it

cannot and should not do

under Seward and Kosmann, which

is

subjective intent 0f BrunoBuilt and

counsel t0 disregard the factual record 0f an enforceable

agreement between the
drafted, BrunoBuilt’s

parties. Id.

its

to rely

upon conclusory statements concerning the

Given a record indicating an

argument concerning additional terms

Consequently, this Court should ﬁnd, as the
this

falls

intent t0 execute the release as

ﬂat in the face of the record.

district court did, that the factual

record in

matter demonstrates the existence 0f a valid, enforceable, settlement agreement between

BrunoBuilt and Strata and afﬁrm the
B.

1.

The claims

asserted

district court’s dismissal

of this matter on that

by BrunoBuilt are barred by the economic

basis.

loss doctrine.

Introduction

This Court should afﬁrm the

district court’s

are subject t0 dismissal as a matter 0f

holding that

all

claims asserted in this action

law because the only damages sought

in those claims are

unrecoverable economic losses to the subject of the transaction—BrunoBuilt’s construction of

22

improvements upon the Property
1593-1597). The

upon increased

district court

it

gained in the

Dempsey

properly found that BrunoBuilt’s damages were entirely based

costs of construction, diminution in value,

property and improvements

it

Contract. (R., at 341-43, 769-770,

and ultimately physical damage

constructed on the Property. BrunoBuilt only obtained the property

and constructed improvements thereon through the Dempsey Contact, leading the
to conclude that the Property

this, the district

to real

district court

and improvements were the subject of the transaction. Because of

court found, as should this Court, that BrunoBuilt’s claims against Strata should

be dismissed because they seek unrecoverable economic losses t0 the subj ect 0f the transaction.
2.

Standard 01 Review

The applicable standard of review
dismissal of a cause 0f action on

is

incorporated herein

3.

for denial

of a motion

summary judgment

by reference

is set

to reconsider the district court’s

forth above, supra, at pp. 12-13,

and

as if set forth in full.

BrunoBuilt’s claims are barred bv the economic loss doctrine.

The
economic

district court correctly

loss. (R., at

found that BrunoBuilt’s alleged damages are nonrecoverable

341-43, 769-770, 1593-1597). The economic loss rule prohibits recovery

0f purely economic losses in a negligence action based upon the principal that there
prevent economic loss to another. Blahd

v.

defective property

which

is

no duty

to

Richard B. Smith, Ina, 141 Idaho 296, 300 108 P.3d

996, 1000 (2004). The rule “applies to negligence cases in general.” Ramerth
194, 197, 983 P.2d 848, 851 (1978).

is

“Economic

loss includes costs ofrepair

v.

Hart, 133 Idaho

and replacement 0f

the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for

inadequate value and consequent loss of proﬁts or use.” Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc.

v.

Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975).

Economic

losses

may be

recoverable in negligence actions, however, if the losses are

23

parasitic to personal injury or property

property other than that Which

Idaho
is

at

damage. “Property damage encompasses damage

the subject 0f the transaction.” Id. (quoting

is

at 309). “It is the subject

35 1, 544 P.2d

to

Salmon Rivers, 97

of the transaction that determines Whether a loss

property damage or economic loss, not the status of the party being sued.” Blahd, 141 Idaho at

301, 108 P.3d at 1001. This Court has determined that “the
the

economic

The party
economic

that has

loss

mean

does not

loss rule,

been sued

a business deal—it

means

‘transaction,’ for purposes

of

the subject of the lawsuit.” Id.

immaterial in determining the subject of the transaction for

is

purpose—the focus

is

the subject 0f the lawsuit. Id. at 300-01, 108 P.3d 1000-01.

The subject of the transaction

a.

word

determined by the contract that actually

is

gives rise t0 the plaintiff’s claim ed damages.

This Court’s decisions in

P.3d 505, 510 (2009) and Brian

Aardema

&

v.

Christie, Inc.

244 P.3d 166, 169 (2010) demonstrate

Dairy Systems, Ina, 147 Idaho 785, 790, 215

U.S.

v.

Leishman

that the subject

Electric, Ina,

of the transaction

is

150 Idaho 22, 25,

to

be determined by

the contract giving rise to the plaintiffs damages, not any contract that might be at issue in the

case. In

Aardema,

this

Court clariﬁed the deﬁnition of “subject of the transaction” to mean “the

underlying contract that
at 5 11

n.2.

Under

equipment as the

this

result

is

the subject of the lawsuit.”

deﬁnition, in a case involving allegations of

0f a malfunction of a milking machine,

of the transaction was the “purchase,

which the

installation,

Brian

the remodeling services for

restaurant they already

Critically, in

&

Christie, this

which the

this

at

791 n.2, 215 P.3d

damage

t0 cattle

and

Court found that the subject

and operation of the milking machine,” for

plaintiff had contracted with the defendants,

at 51 1-12. Similarly, in

Aardema, 147 Idaho

and not the

cattle. Id. at

791—92, 215 P.3d

Court found that the subj ect 0f the transaction was

plaintiff

owned that burned in an

had contracted with the defendants, not the

electrical ﬁre.

150 Idaho

at 26,

244 P.3d

at 170.

each of those cases, the Idaho Supreme Court focused on the contract that

24

actually gave rise to the plaintiffs’ damages. See

12 (ﬁnding that the plaintiff

installation,

at

Aardema, 147 Idaho

was not damaged by

at

791-92, 215 P.3d at 51 1-

the purchase 0f cows, but

and operation of the milking machine); Brian

&

Christie,

by

150 Idaho

the purchase,

at 26,

244 P.3d

170 (ﬁnding that the purchase of the restaurant destroyed by ﬁre was not the source of damage

caused by a subsequent contract for services, Which were negligently rendered). In essence,
is

this

a temporal distinction, focusing on the transaction most recently entered into by the plaintiff

related to the alleged

b.

The

damage, not some

collateral transaction

BrunoBuilt’s contract with the Dempseys

allegations of BrunoBuilt’s Complaint

show

removed
is

in time

Dempsey

which BrunoBuilt acquired title

to the Property, as alleged in paragraph 10

is

0f the Complaint:

Pursuant and subject to a contract With [the Dempseys], BrunoBuilt holds

legal title t0

and constructed a resident upon

construction of the residence, BrunoBuilt

Dempseys
(R., at pp. 10-1 1,

in

11

exchange for
10).

This

is

focus 0n damages to BrunoBuilt

20.

0f the transaction

of a home on the Property, through

BrunoBuilt’s contract with the

10.

injury.

the subject 0fthe transaction.

that the subject

for construction

from the

As

full

Upon completeion 0f
reconvey the [Property] t0 the

[the Property].

is t0

payment 0f the contract price.

supported by the remaining allegations of the Complaint, Which

ﬂowing from

this contract:

a direct and proximate result of [Strata’s] professional negligence,

BrunoBuilt has suffered damages in the form of increased costs of construction,

and inspection, increased interest costs, the
construction 0f a retaining wall and other related expenses that would not have
otherwise been incurred. BrunoBuilt’s alleged damages also include the lost
market value of the [Property] and improvements constructed on that lot.
including

additional

testing

.

(R., at p. 12,

20).

1]

These damages

ﬂow

from the Dempsey

years after the professional services provided

completed. The
to recovery.

Dempsey

As

by

contract,

Strata t0 a third party, Terra Nativa,

Dempsey
25

.

Which was entered

contract provides the basis for BrunoBuilt’s alleged

such, the subject of the

.

contract, the Property

damages and

into

were
right

and the residence

BrunoBuilt contracted to construct upon
holding, Which this Court should afﬁrm,

are the subject of the transaction.

it,

is

why

the

economic

home caused by

settling

where the home was constructed.

who

Id. at

299, 108 P.3d 996, 999.

owned

the

home and

The undeveloped

who performed

evaluations. Id. Years later, the buyer/contractor offered the

home

soil

under the

the undeveloped land

acted as a general contractor in constructing the house. Id.

developed the area into a subdivision, including those

for negligence,

0f uncompacted

house. 141 Idaho at 299, 108 P.3d at 999. Originally, one party

a buyer,

loss rules bars recovery

homeowners sued a developer and engineering ﬁrms

seeking recovery for damage to their

district court’s

consistent With that analysis

This Court’s decision in Blahd demonstrates
in this matter. There,

The

soil

for sale. Id.

lot

was

sold to

Several parties

and foundation

The Blahds toured

noticed a small crack in a concrete slab in the unﬁnished basement; before

purchasing the home, they hired an engineer to determine the cause of the crack and provide an
evaluation and remedy. Id.

The Blahds purchased the home and began

placed over the area Which featured the crack in the basement.

tile

remodel; slate

few months

later,

tile

was

the

new

had cracked in the same place where the original concrete crack was seen, and other small

cracks began t0 appear throughout the home. Id.

at

A

Id.

t0

which point

it

The Blahds hired

was discovered that improperly compacted

sustain physical damage. Id.

The Blahds ﬁled

summary judgment under the economic

On

loss rule. Id.

appeal, the Blahds argued the

subject of the transaction

was

the defective

lot,

caused the

home

26

to settle

district court

and

including the

granted the motions.

for

Id.

loss doctrine did not apply because the

Which caused recoverable damage

constructed home. Id. at 300, 108 P.3d 996, 1000.

home—

The developers and engineers moved

The

economic

ﬁll dirt

against several parties,

suit

developers, geotechnical engineers, and inspectors. Id.

Strata to inspect their

t0 the later-

This Court disagreed, ﬁnding that the house

and

lot are

an integrated whole, meaning any damage to the house

the lot and house together

were the subject of the transaction.

Id.

is

As

an economic loss because

such, the economic loss rule

barred claims against the developer and engineering ﬁrm, Which had examined the soil for the

previous homeowner, because the loss in question was limited t0 the subject 0f the transaction

and the

plaintiffs

had no contractual relationship With the developer or engineers upon Which

recovery of economic losses could be based.

Id.

The Property and the house

c.

The same reasoning
built

is

applicable in this matter.

by BrunoBuilt are an integrated whole.

Here, BrunoBuilt acquired the Property solely t0 built a house on

to

it,

at

which point

it

was

reconvey the Property to the Dempseys—one transaction pursuant to one contract. Contrary to

BrunoBuilt’s suggestion that the acquisition 0f the Property and the construction 0f the house

were somehow separate

transactions, the allegations

from BrunoBuilt’s Complaint, supra,

p. 25,

demonstrate that they were integrated. BrunoBuilt only acquired the Property to construct the
house. Thus, just as in Blahd, while

damage

to the

home

did occur, that

damage

is

a non-

recoverable economic loss to the subject 0f the transaction. Where, as here, the source of the
alleged

damage

is

the lot that underlies the house along with increased construction costs,

diminution in value associated therewith, and damage t0 house, the house and

lot are

an

integrated Whole. See Blahd, 141 Idaho at 300-01, 108 P.3d 1000-01. Thus, pursuant t0 Blahd,

the subject of the transaction

constructed thereon. Because

from

is

the subject of this litigation: the Property

all

damages claimed

that transaction, this matter should

in this matter are

be dismissed pursuant

to the

and the improvements

economic losses ﬂowing

economic

loss doctrine.

C. BrunoBuilt’s claims are time barred by I.C. §§ 5-219(4) and 5-241(a).
1.

Introduction

Although the

district court

withdrew

its

MSJ Decision
27

holding that this matter should be

dismissed With prejudice because the claims asserted were not timely ﬁled, this Court

afﬁrm the
71).

district court’s dismissal

The record

of this action based upon that theory.

substantial completion of their

As

such,

any claims

arising

work

5,

2008,

t0 Terra Nativa

still

334-341, 770-

ﬁnished their work on the Nativa Terra

in this matter reﬂects that Strata

Subdivision No. 4 on or around February

(R., at

may

which time they sent certiﬁcation of

at

LLP and

the City 0f Boise. (R., at p. 143).

from that work, which constitutes an improvement

to real property

automatically accrued six years from that pursuant to LC. § 5-241(a), on February

5,

2014.

Pursuant t0 LC. § 5—219(4), professional negligence claims 0f the type asserted in this matter

must be ﬁled Within two years of that

date,

on 0r before February

did not ﬁle this action until September 19, 2017,

5,

2016. Because BrunoBuilt

time-barred and should be dismissed with

it is

prejudice.

2.

Standard 0 Review

The applicable standard of review

incorporated herein

3.

by reference

This Court
relied

Although the

upon

is

set forth above, supra, at pp. 12-13,

the dismissal

0f

withdrew

its

this action

may

Speciﬁcally, this Court has held that “the appellate court

v.

Coward

v.

still

dismiss this action on that basis.

may afﬁrm

the

trial

court on a theory

Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 289, 246 P.3d 391, 398 (2010)

Kootenai Cnly. Fire

&

Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 397, 224 P.3d 458, 464

(2008)). In Curlee, for example, this Court found that

summary judgment 0n

0n alternative grounds not

decision dismissing this matter as a matter of law

pursuant to LC. §§ 5-219(4) and 5-241(a), this Court

(quoting Curlee

and

Reconsideration Decision.

district court

not relied upon below.”

district court’s

as if set forth in full.

may afﬁrm
in the

0f a motion t0 reconsider the

summary judgment

dismissal of a cause of action on

is

for denial

it

could address an alternative ground for

appeal, even though the district court did not consider that issue or rely

28

upon

it

statute

in

its

ruling below. 148 Idaho at 397,

of limitations and

statute

4.

it.

(R., at

did not need to rely upon that ruling upon reconsideration

t0 I.C.

$8 5-219(4) and 5-241(a).

LC. §§ 5-219(4) and 5-241(a) are applicable

This Court has held that

LC.

it

BrunoBuilt’s claims against Strata should be dismissed because they are time-

a.

action.

464. Here, the applicability of the

334-341, 770-71).

barred pursuant

at issue, the

at

of repose was fully briefed and argued twice and ruled upon

once, the Court simply determined

and withdrew

224 P.3d

when

here.

professional engineering services used in construction are

provisions 0f LC. §§ 5-219(4) and 5-241 apply t0 determine accrual of the cause 0f

See Nerco Minerals C0.

v.

Morrison Knudsen Corp, 140 Idaho 144, 90 P.3d 894 (2004).

§ 5-219(4) applies t0 “professional malpractice,”

which

is

deﬁned

as “wrongful acts or

omission in the performance 0f professional services by any person, ﬁrm, association, entity or
corporation licensed t0 perform such services under the law 0f the state of Idaho.” LC. § 5219(4). In Nerco, this Court held that claims arising out 0f the provision of professional

engineering services

fall

within this deﬁnition and are, thus, governed by section 5-219(4).

149, 90 P.3d at 899. Pursuant t0 LC. § 5-219(4), professional malpractice actions

Id. at

must be ﬁled

within two years 0f accrual 0f the cause 0f action. I.C. § 5-219(4).

Construction matters in Idaho are governed by the statute of repose set forth in I.C.

241 which provides that
,

tort actions

§

5-

automatically accrue six years after the “ﬁnal completion 0f

construction” of the improvement at issue and contract actions accrue immediately

upon ﬁnal

completion of construction of the improvement. This Court’s analysis in the Nerco Minerals,
supra,

makes

the distinction in accrual time

between

tort actions

and contract actions somewhat

inapplicable t0 claims arising out of the provision of engineering services, holding that those

claims sound in professional malpractice.

1d. at

147, 90 P.3d 897
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Here, the contract entered into between Terra Nativa and Strata, Inc. was unquestionably

one for the provision of professional services by
1m

7-8).

According

to the language

Strata, Inc.

and

its

employees. (R.,

of the 2003 contract between the

at pp. 19-20,

parties, Strata

provide the “Geotechnical Services Evaluation for Nativa Terra Subdivision No. 3.” (R.,

The engineering,

geotechnical, and consulting services performed

by

Strata,

was

to

at 137).

persons 0r entities

licensed to perform such services in the state of Idaho, are clearly the type of professional
services contemplated

one that applies

Before the

“Final completion” under LC.
district court,

would be governed by

at pp.

LC.

as such, the two-year statute

0f limitations

is

the only

t0 the claims asserted in this action.

b.

forth in

by LC. §5-219(4);

§ 5-241is determined by the scope 0fwork.

BrunoBuilt did not dispute that the claims

at issue in this action

the two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice claims set

§ 5-219(4) or that the claims

BrunoBuilt

is

156—57). Thus, the inquiry before this Court

asserting against Strata

sound

in tort. (R.,

Whether the work performed by Strata

is

giving rise to the claims asserted in this matter reached “ﬁnal completion” for purposes of LC. §
5-241(a). Applicable case law demonstrates that the

work performed by

Terra subdivision reached ﬁnal completion on February

The question of when ﬁnal completion of
§ 5-241, is

guided by Stapleton

v.

5,

Strata’

occurred, for the purposes of LC.

& Pump

C0,, 153 Idaho 735, 291 P.3d

418 (2012). There, Stapleton and Cushman orally contracted for the
Stapleton’s residential lot in August 2006. Id. at 738, 291 P.3d at 421.

and capped

in

August 2006.

connected the well.

Id.

Id.

The following

drilling

year, Stapleton built a

new

3O

of a well on

The well was completed
house on the

In 2010, the well stopped producing water, at

discovered the well had collapsed, requiring a

on the Nativa

2008.

work

Jack Cushman Drilling

Strata

well t0 be drilled.

Id.

lot

and

it

was

which time

On

April

6,

2011,

Stapleton sued

Cushman

summary judgment, Which

contract. Id.

Cushman moved

the district court granted, because Stapleton’s claims

the statute of limitations. Id.

analyze

and breach of

for negligence

On

appeal, this Court

afﬁrmed and,

when Cushman’s work was ﬁnally completed under I.C.

in

doing

so,

for

were barred by

was required

to

§ 5-241. Id.

Stapleton supported his position With assertions similar to those

made by BrunoBuilt

before the district court in this case, submitting a declaration which provided in part:

6. I

am

not a geologist 0r a well

property, and I asked

needed water for my
do everything necessary to

driller. I

Bob Cushman

t0

have water on the property.
Id.

This Court rejected Stapleton’s argument, noting that “Mr. Stapleton's argument

statute

the

0f limitations would not begin t0 run

improvement was ﬁnally completed.”

until the contract

Id. Instead,

was ﬁnally completed

The Idaho Court of Appeals reached
853 P.2d 635

(Ct.

in

the court held that: “‘[T]his claim deals

August 2006.”

a similar conclusion in

App. 1993), ﬁnding

that

that the

was ﬁnally completed, not when

with construction of a water well, not With construction of a residence.’ The record
construction 0f the well

is

is

clear that

Id. (alternation in the original).

Barab

v.

ﬁnal completion occurred

Plumleigh, 123 Idaho 890,

When

a wood-stove and 10g

lighting device as installed, not connected t0 propane. Id. at 893, 853 P.2d at 638.

Barab and Stapleton
BrunoBuilt relied in the

are

distinguishable

from the foreign precedent upon Which

ofNew Jersey

district c0u11:, State

2015). (R., at 158-59). There, the State of

New

v.

Perini Corp, 113 A.2d 1199 (NJ.

Jersey sued multiple defendants based

upon

defects in a high-temperature hot water system installed in a prison facility as part of a

multiphase construction project. 113 A.2d

at

1203.

The

contract provided for construction in

three phases, designed t0 allow the State t0 begin housing prisoners in waves. Id. A11 phases 0f

the facility

were

to

be serviced by the hot water system and were connected t0 that system as

31

they were completed.

Phase

I,

and the

last

1204.

Id. at

The completion time between the

phase, Phase IIA,

was 360

days, With Phase

I

to

ﬁrst phase of the project,

be completed Within 765

days and Phase IIA to be completed within 1095 days of notice to proceed.

Id.

Substantial

completion of the physical plant, which housed the water system, and portions 0f the inmate
housing

facilities

occurred 0n

May

16, 1997,

occurring between July 15, 1997, and

May

1,

With completion 0f remaining part 0f the project
1998. Id.

The

State

of New Jersey brought

suit

April 28, 2008, alleging failure of the hot water system, requiring an interpretation of the

on

New

Jersey statute 0f repose t0 determine whether the claims asserted were time-barred.

Rather than a focus on “ﬁnal completion,” as in LC. § 5-241, the

New

Jersey statute

provides that actions shall not be brought “more than 10 years after the performance or
furnishing” of construction and design related services. Id. at 1207-08.
the determination of whether performance

completion; however, this
that

is

is

complete

is

Under

tied to the issuance

not always dispositive, as the

New

New

of a certiﬁcate of

Jersey Supreme Court has held

“any departure from the date when the certiﬁcate of substantial completion

driven

by

the facts of the individual case.” Id. at 1208.

between those With supervisory
that the statute

work, even

would begin

if the project

to

responsibilities

New

and those hired

to

is

whole was not completed.

Id.

issued

is

Jersey law also distinguishes

perform discrete

tasks, noting

run against contractors on the date they completed

as a

Jersey law,

The

statute

all

of

their

only focuses 0n

completion 0f an entire multiphase project “when a designer, planner, or person participating in
the construction of an

improvement

the construction 0f the project.”

Supreme Court
Without a

in Perini

lull in activity

Id.

found that

to real property

has continuing responsibility throughout

(emphasis added). Under this framework, the
all

New

Jersey

defendants were continuously involved in the project

such that the statute of repose would not begin t0 run until the project
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was completed. BrunoBuilt’s claims against
Stapleton and

Barab than those
c.

Strata are far

more analogous

in Perinz'.

Final completion 0f Strata’s work pursuant

February

with Terra Nativa.

t0 I.C.

§

5-241(a) occurred 0n

2008.

5,

Here, unlike Perini, the record shows that Strata’s
continuous. Strata’s

to those at issue in

work was performed

(R., at 125-143).

work on

the subdivision

in multiple phases, pursuant t0 a series

According

to the

its

evaluation on

November

13,

its

response to Kleinfelder

n0 further input on the

report. (R., at p. 127,

011

11

its

March

8).

chosen engineer, Kleinfelder.

4,

2007

contract,

March

4,

2010, and the applicable two-

states that Strata will

it

March

issued a “Conﬁrmation 0f Construction,” establishing that the

2008. (R., at

5,

p.

143). Pursuant to I.C. §§ 5-219

arising out

of the work would have accrued on February

limitations

would have run on February

matter, ﬁled

on September

19,

5,

5,

4,

2012.

“provide observation, testing,

and consultation during construction 0f Terra Nativa Subdivision, Phase 4.”

February

(R., at p.

completion date, negligence

this

year statute 0f limitations set forth in I.C. § 5-219(4) would have run 0n
to the

3.” Strata

2004, after which time Strata provided

Based upon

claims arising out of the 2003 report would accrue 0n

With respect

No.

2003, and subsequently engaged in required third—party

review of that evaluation with the City of Boise and
137). Strata issued

0f contracts

language 0f the 2003 contract, Strata was

t0 provide “the Geotechnical Services Evaluation for Terra Native Subdivision

issued

was not

(R., at p. 139). Strata

work was completed

as

0f

and 5-241, any negligence claim

2014, and,

at the latest, the statute

of

2016. Consequently, BrunoBuilt’s claims in this

2017, were over a year outside the statute of limitations.

Unlike in Perim', Strata’s work on the Subdivision was separated by multi-year gaps.
Further, Strata issued a certiﬁcation 0f completion of

2008, after which time, there

is

no evidence

its

in the record
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work 0n

showing

the project

Strata’s

0n February

5,

involvement With the

project until

it

was asked

to consult concerning the earth

movement

under Perini, Strata’s issuance of a certiﬁcate 0f completion
project

is

that occurred in 2016.

determinative that

work on

the

had reached ﬁnal completion, regardless of Whether the project continued.
Stapleton

is

perhaps most instructive in determining what constitutes “ﬁnal completion”

in this matter because BrunoBuilt contends, just as Stapleton did, that

the

its

Even

statutes

of limitation/repose because, among other things,

it is

“it

entitled to relief

has no

from

geological

or

geotechnical experience” and, thus, “could not have been required to discover the defect in
Strata’s services.” (R., at p.

169

and regulations applicable

to

n.9). In addition to

ﬂying in the face 0f Boise City Ordinances

BrunoBuilt’s construction activities (requiring a site-speciﬁc

geotechnical analysis prior to issuance 0f a building permit—provided

this is the

same argument

that

Stapleton’s purported reliance

was found

to

it,

in this instance),

be unavailing in Stapleton. There, regardless of

upon the defendant

the well-driller should connect

by MTI

to deliver a functioning well

and his belief that

the Court found that ﬁnal completion occurred

was ﬁnished, not When the owner decided

to

have

it

connected to a

When

the well

later constructed residence.

Here, the fact that Strata contracted With Terra Nativa at various points in time to provide
geotechnical engineering services does not require Strata to forever serve as the guarantor of the
geological and geotechnical stability of the lot at issue in this case as BrunoBuilt argues. Indeed,

as part

of construction on the

assessment, Which

Hillside

New

it

lot,

BrunoBuilt had to obtain

did, t0 ensure the site

Residential

Guide,

was

its

own, lot-speciﬁc geotechnical

suitable for construction. See City

Department

Application

#404-B,

of Boise,

available

at

https://WWW.cityofboise.org/departments/planning-and-development-services/building/building—

permits/residential-construction-400/404-hillside—new-residential/ (last Visited July 25, 2019)
(requiring an inspection, report, and

recommendation by a
34

State

of Idaho Engineer licensed in

soil classiﬁcation

and investigation prior

to issuing a building permit);

09 (requiring information for a building permit for
to the Boise City Public

Works

site-speciﬁc

geotechnical

Consultants, states that the report

and

soils

are

made

is

with the Hillside Ordinance, each noting that a separate,

was

analysis

required.

The

1992

prepared by

report,

Howard

preliminary and “not a substitute for site-speciﬁc geological

engineering evaluations required for ﬁnal design.” (R., at p. 446). Similar statements
in the 1998 report in a section entitled “Opinions

475), noting that
as development

“it is essential for Strata to

is

planned for them.”

reports. (See R., at p.

540 (noting

(R., at p. 498). This

The record shows no involvement by
certiﬁcation of completion

(R., at p.

does not constitute a contract or other

is

true of all citations t0 the 1998

that other geotechnical engineering

involved); at p. 544 (noting a desire t0 discuss future

its

and Recommendations,”

continue to perform evaluation of the individual lots

requirement that required Strata to perform this work. This

following

be submitted according

foothills construction

Development Manual, including Application #404-B).

Hillside

Strata’s reports are consistent

Boise City Code § 11-07-

work on

ﬁrms could be become

the proj ect)).

Strata in the Nativa Terra Subdivision project

on February

5,

2008. This

is

when

the ﬁnal completion

occurred for purposes 0f I.C. § 5-241; thus, BrunoBuilt’s claims in this action are time-barred.

D. The claims against Michael

Woodworth should be

upon the uncontroverted evidence
1.

dismissed based

in the record of this matter.

Introduction

Although not addressed by the

district court

based upon

its

global dismissal 0f claims,

Respondent Michael Woodworth argued, based upon the uncontroverted factual record before
the Court, that the claims against

him should be dismissed with prejudice because he had no

involvement in the geotechnical engineering services

at issue in this action. (R., at pp.

312-313,

343). In the event this Court determines that BrunoBuilt’s claims against Strata should survive
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appeal, this Court should

2.

still

afﬁrm

the dismissal of claims against Mr.

Standard 0 Review

The applicable standard of review
dismissal of a cause of action on

is

incorporated herein

3.

for denial

of a motion to reconsider the

summary judgment

by reference

as if set forth in

is set

forth above, supra, at pp. 12-13,

BrunoBuilt has presented n0 evidence 0f Mr. Woodworth’s involvement

discussed, supra, at p. 28-29, this Court

grounds not relied upon by the
not reach the issue given

against

district court’s

Mike Woodworth

its

district court t0

may afﬁrm the

reach

its

decision.

holding 0f the

Although the

Woodworth sought summary judgment based upon

involvement in the geotechnical engineering work
declarations 0f Mr.

district court

district court

ﬁnd

0n
did

that the claims

be dismissed with prejudice based upon a lack of

evidence in the record showing his involvement in the engineering work
Here, Mr.

in the

in this matter.

global dismissal 0f claims, this Court should

in this action should

and

full.

geotechm’cal engineering work at issue

As

Woodworth.

Woodworth and Mr. Howard.

at issue,

at issue.

a lack of evidence of his

which was supported by the sworn

(R., at pp. 47, 3 12-3 13, 343). In

opposing

this

motion, BrunoBuilt relied upon a recital in a draft settlement agreement and conjectural
statements concerning Mr.

Woodworth’s employment

at

MTI

to argue that there are questions

0f material fact concerning claims against Mr. Woodworth related to his employment with
Strata or

involvement in

its

geotechnical engineering

68). This is insufﬁcient t0 demonstrate the existence

work

at issue in this case.6 (R., at pp. 166-

of a question of material fact concerning

claims against Mr. Woodworth, requiring those claims to be dismissed With prejudice.

6

BrunoBuilt also makes reference t0 Mr. Woodworth’s involvement in the April 1, 2016, report
prepared for Terra Nativa, which has nothing to do With BrunoBuilt’s claims in this matter,

which

arise

from

Strata’s

site

investigation

investigation. (R., at pp. 166—68, 199-210).
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and preparation work,

not

post-movement

E. BrunoBuilt

BrunoBuilt
support

is

not entitled t0 attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.

is

not entitled to attorney’s fees and costs on appeal because

request With argument and authority as required

its

This Court has “repeatedly held that
that

is

[it]

Bream

(2003)). In Capps, this Court held that

mere

are sought “is not sufﬁcient to support an

What BrunoBuilt has done
BrunoBuilt only

here.

is

agreement.

award 0f attorney

cites I.C. § 12-120(3),

on appeal

N.A., 149 Idaho

Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 369, 79 P.3d 723, 728

fees

See Appellant’s Opening Brief,

entitled to attorney’s fees

Id.

FIA Card Servs.,

citation to a statute pursuant to

the associated rule that allows this Court to

it

v.

v.

failed to

and applicable case law.

I.A.R. 41

will not consider a request for attorney fees

not supported by legal authority 0r argument.” Capps

737, 744, 240 P.3d 583, 590 (quoting

claims

by

it

which attorney’s fees

on appeal.”

Id.

That

because

precisely

at 34.

Without reference t0 or citation of

award

is

its

language 0r

fees pursuant t0 that statute, I.A.R. 41,

this

was an

and

action to enforce a settlement

Indeed, BrunoBuilt does not even argue that the gravamen 0f the claims related to

the settlement agreement involved a commercial transaction, as required for entitlement to fees

pursuant to I.C.

§

12-120(3).7 Consequently, this Court should

provided sufﬁcient argument and authority to support
F. Strata should

be awarded

§§ 12-121, 12-120(3),
1.

Strata

1's

its

its

that

BrunoBuilt has not

requests for attorney’s fees.

attorney’s fees

and I.A.R. 40 and

ﬁnd

and

costs

0n appeal pursuant

to I.C.

41.

entitled t0 recover costs in this action

pursuant

to I.A.R. 40.

Pursuant to I.A.R. 40(a), “costs shall be allowed as a matter 0f course to the prevailing
party unless otherwise provided

award of costs 0n appeal
7

this

the Court.” Strata respectfully request an

in this matter.

Interestingly, although the

argued that

by law or order of

brieﬁng does not appear in the record 0f

this matter,

BrunoBuilt

matter did not involve a commercial transaction to support an award of

attorney’s fees pursuant t0 LC. § 12-120(3) in opposing Strata’s request for attorney’s fees.
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Strata

2.

Strata

is

entitled t0 attorney

is

’S

fees pursuant t0 I.C. 6 12-12].

on appeal because BrunoBuilt has

entitled to attorney’s fees

failed to present

any

signiﬁcant issue regarding a question of law, has not demonstrated a reasonable question as to
the district court’s factual ﬁndings,

“An award 0f fees 0n
v.

Hemenway

appeal

& Maser C0.,

and has not legitimately advanced any new legal standards.

may be

granted pursuant t0 I.A.R. 41(3) and I.C. § 12—121.” Ernst

126 Idaho 980, 988, 895 P.2d 581, 589 (1995). Per

In any civil action, the judge

may award

I.C. § 12-121:

reasonable attorney's fees to the

prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal 0r

amend any
I.C. § 12-121.

court

is left

statute

“Under

which otherwise provides

I.C. § 12-121, attorney fees are

86,

foundationless

91

(2009).

when

it

fees.

to the prevailing party if the

ex

rel.

Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401, 406,
is

frivolous,

unreasonable, or

does not present any signiﬁcant issue regarding a question 0f law,

it

to the settlement issue,

trial

court’s factual ﬁndings

does not advance any

modiﬁcation 0f existing ones. Ernst, 126 Idaho

at 988,

895 P.2d

new

it

does

were supported by

legal standards or seek

at 598.

BrunoBuilt does nothing more than ask

second guess two well-reasoned decisions of the
statements

awarded

This Court has held an appeal

and competent evidence, and

With respect

State,

v.

not present a reasonable question of Whether the
substantial

award of attorney's

with the belief that the proceeding was brought, pursued, 0r defended frivolously,

unreasonably, 0r Without foundation.” Harris

210 P.3d

for the

district court

on the

this

Court to

basis 0f after-the—fact

of subjective intent provided by BrunoBuilt’s principal and former counsel.

BrunoBuilt has not and does not dispute the basic terms 0f the settlement, an exchange of a
Pierringer release for a covenant not t0 sue from the Rowans, but instead

tries to

excuse

its

non—

performance under the agreement through hyper-technical arguments concerning modiﬁcation of
the agreement’s terms

and subjective

intent. Indeed, this

38

case bears striking similarity to Seward,

discussed supra, pp. 14-16, in which this Court found that an award of fees was warranted

pursuant t0 LC. § 12-121. Seward, 164 Idaho

warranted here. The situation presented in
refusal

at

_,

this case,

426 P.3d

though,

is

at

1260.

The same

result is

more egregious. BrunoBuilt’s

perform the settlement agreement has necessitated multiple motions from the

t0

Defendants in order to obtain the relief upon which they previously agreed:

(1) a

motion

to

dismiss based upon failure of service; (2) a motion to enforce settlement and motion for

summary judgment; and

(3)

a motion to reconsider. Further, as the district court found,

BrunoBuilt’s argument against enforcement of the settlement was contradicted by the record.

Thus, as in Seward, this Court should award Strata fees pursuant to LC.

§

12—121.

BrunoBuilt’s arguments concerning the economic loss rule are similarly frivolous, as the
scenario presented in this matter

was well addressed under Idaho law and sought damages

that

BrunoBuilt had a right to and was seeking to collect from multiple other parties under sound
legal theories.

As

the Ninth Circuit has explained:

The economic

damages that are
certain economic
See Giles

v.

designed to maintain a distinction between damage
of contract and for tort. The term ‘economic loss’ refers t0

loss doctrine

remedies for breach

solely

is

monetary

.

.

.

.

The economic

loss doctrine provides that

losses are properly remediable only in contract.

Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp, 494 F.3d 865, 873 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, BrunoBuilt

has a contractual remedy against the Dempseys, MTI, and others, which

Ada County Case Nos. CV01-16-22916.
relationship

Thus,

its

it is

also pursuing in

claim against Strata with which

and has established n0 duties with respect

to

the Property

is

it

has no

frivolous

and

unsupported in law, as such claims are otherwise remediable by contract and, thus, barred by the

economic

loss doctrine

This

is

under applicable law.

additionally

compounded by

’

pointed out in Defendants Motion

t0

the assertion 0f claims without factual support.

As

Enforce Settlement, 0r Alternatively, Motion for Summary
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Judgment and supporting documents

(R., at p. 47),

Respondent Mike Woodworth despite the

BrunoBuilt continues to assert claims against

fact that the uncontroverted evidence established that

he did not work for Strata until the geotechnical and geological engineering work
nearly ﬁnished and, even then, did not perform any
question. (See generally R., at pp. 122-23, 125,

1T

work 0n

or related to the lot 0r

10). In the face

was

home

in

of such an egregious lack of

advanced on appeal, Strata

factual or legal support for the claims

at issue

is

entitled to recover their

attorney’s fees pursuant t0 I.C. § 12—121.

3.

Strata

is

entitled t0 attorney

’s

fees pursuant to I.C. $

12-1208).

A prevailing patty on appeal may be awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to I.A.R. 41 (a) and
I.C. § 12-120(3).

Pursuant t0

See

H-D

I.C. § 12—120(3), “[i]n

unless otherwise provided

fee t0

be

Transport

set

by

by law,

v.

any

Pogue, 160 Idaho 428, 436, 374 P.3d 591, 599 (2016).

civil action to

recover

.

.

.

in

any commercial transaction

the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s

the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.” I.C. § 12-120(3).

‘commercial transaction’

household purposes.”

Id.

is

deﬁned

to

mean

all

“The term

transactions except transactions for personal or

This Court has recognized that section 12-120(3) allows for recovery of

attorney’s fees in claims for professional negligence. See Soigm‘er

326, 256 P.3d 730, 734 (201

v.

Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322,

1).

“In order for a prevailing party to recover attorney fees under [I.C. § 12-120(3)], ‘[t]he
critical test is

whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the

commercial transaction must be

integral to the claim

attempting t0 recover.”’ Lettum‘ch
1104, 1110—11 (2005) (quoting

v.

Key Bank

Bingham

v.

and constitute a basis on which the party

is

Nat. Ass’n, 141 Idaho 362, 368—69, 109 P.3d

Montane Resource

987 P.2d 1035, 1041 (1999)). This can occur Where the
40

Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 426,

plaintiff alleges that

it is

a party to a

commercial transaction involving the defendant, even

if the

defendant ultimately disproves the

existence 0f a commercial relationship between plaintiff and defendant.

H-D

Transport

v.

Pogue,

160 Idaho 428, 436, 374 P.3d 591, 599 (2016). This rule applies With equal force in claims for
professional malpractice. Id.; see also Pogue, 160 at 436, 374 P.3d at 599 (“[W]hen a plaintiff

alleges a

commercial contract

commercial contract never

and the defendant successﬁllly defends by showing that the

exists

existed, the court

awards the defendant attorney

fees.”).

Here, BrunoBuilt’s claims were asserted based upon an alleged relationship between

BrunoBuilt and Strata based upon Strata’s provision 0f professional engineering services in the
construction 0f the Terra Nativa subdivision. (R., at pp. 10-11, 1W 9-16; pp. 13-14, 1W 22-26).

Indeed, BrunoBuilt claimed

it

was

a third-party beneﬁciary 0f the commercial transaction

pursuant t0 Which Strata provided professional services.
recover

its

1m 22-26. Thus, Strata

is

entitled t0

attorney’s fees incurred in defense of these claims pursuant to I.C. §

12—120(3)

1d,,

because the existence of a commercial transaction was integral t0 the allegations 0f professional
negligence

made by

BrunoBuilt. Indeed, BrunoBuilt appears to concede that a commercial

transaction constitutes the

gravamen of claims

related t0 the settlement agreement, as

it

has

requested fees pursuant to I.C. § 12—120(3) in this matter. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, at 34.

Consequently, this Court should award Strata

V.

its

Strata

Judgment of the

and

I.C. §§

authority,

and the record before

district court

be afﬁrmed and that Strata be awarded

to I.A.R. 41

on appeal.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing argument and
respectfully request that the

attorney’s fees incurred

dismissing

their attorney’s fees

12-120(3) and 12-121.

41

all

this Court, Strata

claims asserted against

and costs on appeal pursuant
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